CAB148-30-Defence and Oversea Policy Committee Meetings Relating to 1967 Disturbances-1967 — Page 100

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to break permanently into the American market for such equipment. If we did

not place the order for the F 111 now, these arrangements would be at risk and it would moreover be open to the Americans to propose an increase in the price of the aircraft; the United States Administration would be under strong political pressure to do so as present arrangements were widely regarded in the United States as unduly favourable to us. Although the Americans were

having difficulty in developing the aircraft to meet their full specification,

our requirements were more limited than theirs and he had that day received from the United States Secretary of Defense (Mr. McNamara) the assurances

that he had sought about the production specification of the aircraft that we

would receive. We should therefore confirm the order for the F 111.

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In discussion the view was expressed that we should attempt to delay ordering the F 111 until the further defence studies were completed so that

this large element in our forward defence programme could be seen in its full

context. Although it might be that we should then decide that the aircraft

was required, this should not be assumed in advance, Changes in our role in

the Far East might have to be so radical that we would not need the F 111 or that we could reduce the size of the planned order. Although the Americans

might seek to increase the price of the aircraft if we delayed placing the

order, there would be good reason why they would not press the point since

they were particularly keen that we should purchase the aircraft. One

possibility that ought to be considered was the linking of the discussions

with the Americans on the F 111 and the offset arrangements for it to the offset problen in Germany.

On the other hand it was urged that it was difficult to foresee

circumstances in which we could do without the capability provided by the

F 111, particularly during a period of phased withdrawal from the bases in

the Far East which was the post likely course of events. The total order of

50 was moreover the minimum that was operationally acceptable if we were to

have it at all. Nor was it easy to see what explanation could be given to

the Americans at this stage for delay in placing the order for the aircraft;

this would not merely involve considerable risk to the offset arrangements

and the price of the aircraft, but it would also involve alerting them prematurely to the possibilities that we were considering about our deployment

in the Far East. We had deliberately sought to avoid doing so until we

were in a position to make specific proposals. As regards the possibility

of linking the F 111 order to the problem of overseas costs of our forces

in Germany, or to even wider arrangements, it was impossible to see where

such a course might lead and it would certainly involve delay to both aspects

which would be likely to be damaging. We might in consequence well find

that the existing F 111 offset arrangements, including part of the

Saudi Arabian sales which had yet to be finalised, would be lost.

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